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VIOLENCE AS A PRODUCT OF IMPOSED ORDER*
BUTLER D. SHAFFER**
Many hypotheses concerning the causes of the violence which
exists in our society have been presented for discussion by scholars
and researchers. In this Article, Professor Shaffer explores another
possible explanation for the violence. He suggests that the imposition
of structured forms of order by a political-legal system (the "structur-
ing" function) in conflict with the system's role of preventing acts of
victimization (the "hygienic" function) produces a frustration of citi-
zens' personal, economic, and social expectations. This frustration as
a result may lead to aggression and violence.
Recent years have witnessed a marked increase in explorations
into the causes of violence in America. The convergence of increases in
crime rates, violent public demonstrations, urban riots (accompanied
by the seemingly indiscriminate killing of people and the looting,
burning and other destruction of property), police brutality, street-
corner gang warfare and other similar forms of interpersonal aggres-
sion has led researchers to attempt to identify causal factors related to
the origins of violence, with a hopeful view to eliminating such causes.
Many hypotheses have been presented for consideration, ranging any-
where from economic causes (i.e., discriminatory hiring practices,
unemployment, inability to fulfill economic expectations, etc.) to a
general breakdown in moral and ethical values. Proposals to eliminate
the causes of violence have included a revamping of social welfare
programs and elimination of discriminatory employment practices on
the one hand, to "cracking down" on lawlessness by upgrading local
law enforcement agencies and imposing stiffer criminal penalties on
the other. There are doubtless as many views as to the causes and
cures for violence as there are observers, each view tinged with the
value system, prejudices, philosophies and epistemological attitudes of
each such observer. It is the purpose of this article to focus attention
on one possible source of violence-not necessarily "the" source, but
one which might very well be found deserving of a share of the burden
for having contributed to the conditions which have led to increased
violence. This article will explore the possibility that the effort to
impose social order may in fact lead to a breakdown of order, and that
any formal legal structure may contain within it dysfunctional ele-
ments which lead to such a result. Employing the basic frustration-
aggression hypothesis, it is the principal contention of this article that
the incidence of violence in our society may be, in part, a product of
the frustration which people perceive in connection with their expecta-
* This article was written through a fellowship from the Law and Liberty Project of the
Institute for Humane Studies, Menlo Park, California.
** Associate Professor in the Law and Society Program, College of Business Administration,
University of Nebraska at Omaha; J.D. 1961, University of Chicago.
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tions of benefits to be derived from a formal system of law; that, in
other words, people have sanctioned the political system out of a belief
that the institution of law will produce a reasonably predictable level
of social order, the failure of which to be realized results in frustration
which, in turn, serves to encourage aggression. That there are numer-
ous additional explanations for the causes of violence and societal
disorder is not to be denied; nor is it to be suggested that imposed
order will always lead to aggression or violence. It is only being
suggested that any system of imposed order, to the degree people
perceive its activities as frustrating their own. expectations, will serve
to increase the tendency toward aggression and violence.
It is well, at this point, to define the terms used in this article.
"State" shall mean a formal organization which enjoys a monopoly on
the use of coercion within a specific geographical area, and which is
sanctioned by a sizable enough portion of the population of that area
to permit it to effectively exercise universal decisionmaking functions
therein. "Law" shall be defined in positivist terms as formal rules
enacted and enforced by the state in furtherance of any policy as
defined by the state. While the article will refer to the writings of such
"natural law" advocates as John Locke, an attempt shall be made not
to confuse the definitions. The article will, instead, refer to "law"
solely in political terms as those formal rules which a political state can
enact and enforce within a given area. The effort to regulate human
conduct within such an area by the use of such rules of law shall thus
constitute efforts to "impose order," the content of said "order" being
determined by those persons exercising effective decisionmaking
through the state. Such definitions shall therefore be considered in a
totally "value-free" setting, and no effort shall be made herein to
evaluate any rules of law in terms of consistency with any socio-
political philosophy or other premise. The effort shall be a descriptive
one, with the only subjective factor being a consideration of the
reaction which people may have to rules of law which are promulgated
by the state, but without regard to whether, in the eyes of
the writer, such reactions are "good" or "bad," or "right" or "wrong."
This article shall, therefore, limit its scope to an examination of
formal systems of political and legal order, and shall not consider the
systems of "order" which prevail throughout any society, and which
are the product not of political lawmaking, but of informal "rulemak-
ing" found within social institutions such as the family, economic,
religious and social organizations, and the mores, customs, manners
and habits of people. It is fairly well recognized, in fact, that without
such informal sources of order, no meaningful social structure could
long endure. Contrasted with the political efforts to impose order by
coercion or the threat of coercion, then, are those informally, voluntar-
ily developed rules of behavior which shall be referred to as "natural
order."
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I. A THEORY OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION
A. The "Hygienic" Function
Any effort to characterize the expectations of such an amorphous
abstraction as "society" or "people" must constitute the height of
presumption. While human beings are continually being collectivized
into various groupings in order to assist in the generalization of human
behavior, it is well not to confuse the abstraction with reality, but to
remember that "society" consists of many separate individuals with
unique tastes, values, motivations, experiences and goals. With this
caveat in mind, an attempt shall nonetheless be made to identify what
appears to be at least the minimum functions which most people
would expect a formal system of law to serve. That different persons
might have various additional expectations from "law" is not to be
denied; it is only being proposed that one can identify a fairly universal
attitude as to the minimum functions which "law" ought to serve, and
that such minimum functions constitute the basis upon which most
people grant their sanction to the "law" and the "state." These
minimum functions have been identified by such philosophers as
Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.
Hobbes observed that, in a state of nature, the basic equality of
men's abilities would lead to conflict in the realization of essentially
equal goals among men, adding that "if any two men desire the same
thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, they become
enemies."' As long as such a condition exists "without a common
power to keep them all in awe," said Hobbes, men will find themselves
in a state of "war of every man against every man." The result of such
a state was eloquently described by Hobbes:
Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where
every man is enemy to every man, the same is consequent to
the time wherein men live without other security than what
their own strength, and their own invention, shall furnish
them withal. In such condition, there is no place for industry,
because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently no
culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the com-
modities that may be imported by sea; no commodious build-
ing; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as
require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no
account of time; no arts; no letters; no society and, which is
the worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death;
and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short. 2
To avoid such adverse consequences, Hobbes concluded that men
introduce "restraints upon themselves" by the creation of a "com-
1. Hobbes, Leviathan, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 366, 367 (W. Ebenstein 3d ed.
1965).
2. Id. at 368.
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monwealth," through which they will get "themselves out from that
miserable condition of war" with a view "to live peaceably amongst
themselves, and be protected against other men." Thus, even though
Hobbes articulated a justification for the authoritarian state, he acknowl-
edged that the fundamental role of the state is to provide order and
security for the lives and property of its citizens.
John Locke was even more explicit as to what he considered to
be the basic function of the state. He noted that, in a state of nature,
every man has a right to restrain those who would seek to interfere
with his right to his life and property, declaring that such interference
creates a "state of war" between the transgressor and his victim: "he
who attempts to get another man into his absolute power does thereby
put himself into a state of war with him; it being ... understood as a
declaration of a design upon his life."' 3 Locke further stated:
To avoid this state of war . . . is one great reason of men's
putting themselves into society, and quitting the state of
nature. For where there is an authority, a power on earth
from which relief can be had by appeal, there the con-
tinuance of the state of war is excluded, and the controversy
is decided by that power. 4
To Locke, then, government serves in the capacity of an "agent"
for members of society, empowered to do those acts-and only those
acts--which such members of society could have rightfully done for
themselves in a state of nature. Since individuals have the right, in
nature, to protect their lives and property from acts of interference by
other men, these same individuals have the right to authorize govern-
ment to perform, in their behalf, this same function. As Locke
reasoned:
A man, as has been proved, cannot subject himself to the
arbitrary power of another; and having, in the state of na-
ture, no arbitrary power over the life, liberty, or possession of
another, but only so much as the law of nature gave him for
the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, this is all
he doth, or can give up to the commonwealth, and by it to
the legislative power, so that the legislative can have no more
than this.5
Contrary to Hobbes, then, Locke argued that the right of each man to
his life and to his property circumscribes the proper limits of gov-
ernmental action, and that any act of government which goes beyond
the function of protecting such rights and begins to interfere with them
exceeds the claims of legitimacy:
The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of
3. Locke, Two Treatises of Government, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 393, 397 (W.
Ebenstein 3d ed. 1965).
4. Id. at 399.
5. Id. at 406.
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his property without his own consent. For the preservation of
property being the end of government and that for which
men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires
that the people should have property, without which they
must be supposed to lose that by entering into society which
was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an
absurdity for any man to own. Men therefore in society
having property, they have such a right to the goods, which
by the law of the community are theirs, that nobody hath a
right to their substance, or any part of it, from them without
their own consent; without this they have no property at all.
For I have truly no property in that which another can by
right take from me when he pleases against my consent.
Hence it is a mistake to think that the supreme or legislative
power of any commonwealth can do what it will, and dispose
of the estates of the subject arbitrarily, or take any part of
them at pleasure. 6
It is not the purpose of this article to debate the "proper" limita-
tions of government action, but only to point out that both Hobbes
(who laid an intellectual foundation for an omnipotent state) and
Locke (who narrowly restricted the functions of the state) agreed that
the primary purpose for which men create institutions of government
and law is the protection of their lives and property from interferences
by other men. At the risk of oversimplification, it would appear that
this view, which seems to find fairly general support among people as
a definition of the basic purpose of government and law, could be
summarized as follows: Men, in order to engage in productive enter-
prises and to have the opportunity for maximizing pleasure and seek-
ing personal fulfillment, must be free from the actions of other men
which, whether intentional or unintentional, violate by force or by
threat of force their persons or property. Men have a need, in other
words, to be free from acts of victimization; to be free from having
their will violated with respect to their persons or property. For this
reason (at least theoretically) men have sanctioned the political state,
whose function it is to provide protection from such acts. This shall be
referred to herein as the "hygienic" function of law, consisting of those
actions of government which are designed to eliminate (or, at least, to
reduce) those negative influences by which some people physically
violate (or threaten to physically violate) the person or property of
others, and thus restrict or otherwise interfere with the right of people
to make decisions concerning their own lives.
Acts of victimization may be either "intentional" or "uninten-
tional." The legal system may respond to intentional wrong-doings
(e.g., murder, rape, burglary, arson, assault) through the institution of
criminal proceedings or civil actions by the victim, while the uninten-
tional acts (e.g., breach of contract, tortious conduct leading to personal
6. Id. at 408.
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injury or property damage) are almost always left to the victim to seek
redress through civil proceedings. In either event, it would seem safe
to conclude that the sanction which most people have for a formal
legal system has, as its fundamental consideration, the expectation that
the system will effectively minimize such negative social influences in
order to protect them from victimization, to provide them the oppor-
tunity to maximize their life, psychic growth and economic potentials,
and to facilitate the free flow and expression of their choices.
B. The "Structuring" Function
As indicated earlier, the element which distinguishes the political
state from other institutions is its enjoyment of a monopoly on the use of
coercion within a specific geographical area. The rationale for the
existence of such a monopoly, whether justified or not, has always been
that the state, in order to effectively restrict acts of violence and other
disorder, must have the ultimate reservoir of power. Or, as one writer
observed: "The function of the police power of the state is to maintain a
threshold of force to deter and/or contain the ever-present margin of
anti-social acts by individuals and groups."'7 Assuming, arguendo, that
such a contention is correct, a fundamental question immediately arises:
Can an institution which has been imbued with a monopoly on
mechanisms of coercion for the purpose of protecting the lives and
property of its citizens from acts of victimization be prevented from
becoming an instrument used by some people for the purpose of imposing
their will upon others, in effect realizing Locke's fear that the state would
become the source rather than the remedy for victimization?
If the political philosophers are correct in concluding that the
nature of men is such that they will, given the opportunity, seek to
take advantage of other men and to impose their will upon them, it is
then not unreasonable to assume that these same men would seek to
gain control of a monopolistic instrument of coercion such as the
political state in order to effectuate such a design. Nor is it so incredi-
ble that such men would, in an effort to make the social environment
more conducive to their own purposes and objectives, seek to redefine
the terms and conditions of the "order" which the state is mandated to
preserve. Given these human tendencies, it can be seen that there
exists the possibility that men and women of differing political,
economic and social persuasions will begin to modify the concept of
"order" so as to embrace an ever-widening range of subject matter.
The result of this process would be that "order" is no longer solely
perceived in terms of the "hygienic" function of eliminating acts or
threatened acts of aggression and violence, but instead is perceived as
including the organization and structuring of human relationships in
order to permit some men, through the use of state coercion, to make
7. Nieburg, Violence, Law, and the Social Process, 11 AM. BEHAVIORAL SCIENTIST,
Mar.-Apr. 1968, at 17.
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the behavior of other men more predictable for their objectives, and
more conducive to their control. That such, in fact, has been the
history of man's efforts with political processes cannot be denied by
any realist. "Order," at least on the American scene, has come to mean
more than simply eliminating crime in the streets: to the businessman
it means a system of laws to restrict the competitive practices of one's
competitors; 8 to the educationalist it means the adoption of state-
enforced standards of instruction applicable to all; to the "moral re-
former" it means the banning of drugs, alcohol and pornographic
books; to the labor union it means the elimination of lower-priced
sources of labor through minimum wage laws; to the manufacturer it
means the restriction of competitive foreign imports through tariffs
and import quotas; to the environmentalist it means restriction of the
development of natural resources; to the railroad or telephone com-
pany executive it means the assurance of restricted entry of would-be
competitors and the comfort of knowing that existing competitors may
not engage in effective price competition through reduced rates;9 to the
farmer it means governmental maintenance of artificially high prices
for farm products; to the doctor, lawyer, barber, dentist, funeral
director, electrician and car dealer it means control over the trade
practices of one's competitors through systems of licensing; and to the
real estate developer it means the regulation through zoning laws of
the use which other men may make of their property. In short, while
the political state continues to be presented to the public as a system of
order designed to protect them from acts of victimization, in truth it
functions as a mechanism for the ordering, regulation and restriction
of human conduct to the end of maintaining a "status quo" for the
benefit of those who would stand most to lose whatever advantage
they presently enjoy were men permitted a greater degree of flexibility
and opportunity for change in their economic and social relationships.
Such "order," enforced by the political state, is reminiscent of the
"order" existing within a cartel, in which, in the words of one ob-
server, "the goal is to restrain disturbing influences, to stabilize prices,
and to assure those in the business the comfortable feeling that their
position is secure."' 0
The "hygienic" function of the state in attempting to restrict acts
of victimization can be contrasted, then, with this latter function of
seeking to structure personal and institutional behavior so as to inter-
fere with the normal processes of change which would accompany
human interrelationships not subject to such restrictions. This shall be
referred to as the "structuring" function of the state, having both the
8. See, e.g., G. DOMHOFF, THE HIGHER CIRCLES: THE GOVERNING CLASS IN AMERICA
(1970); G. KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM (1963); J. WEINSTEIN, THE CORPORATE
IDEAL IN THE LIBERAL STATE, 1900-1918 (1968).
9. See, e.g., G. KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION: 1877-1916 (1965).
10. H. FLEMING, TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS 42 (1951).
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purpose and effect of imposing restraints on the non-coercive activities
and decisionmaking of individuals in order to prevent such individuals
from acting contrary to the interests of those persons or groups which
have been successful in obtaining the imposition of such restraints.
The "hygienic" function, being designed only to protect people
against acts of victimization, theoretically precludes the condition in
which the power of the state is used by some people to victimize others.
The "structuring" function, on the other hand, is designed to allow
some men to interfere with the peaceful activities of others. Its purpose
is to permit the monopolistic power of the state to be used to control
the activities and the environment of other men to the end that those
successful in achieving such control may effectively limit the choices
and decisions of other people.
C. Conflict in the Relationship between the
"Hygienic" and "Structuring" Functions
Once the role of the state expands to include the "structuring"
function, a conflict of purpose arises, and to the degree such a conflict is
perceived by members of society, the seeds of potential discontent are
sown. For if the state theoretically exists in order to protect people from
acts of victimization and to provide a threshold of safety and security
from interference for persons and their property such as will allow them
to seek to maximize their well-being and happiness, it becomes difficult to
justify the state becoming the source of negative restraints upon personal
behavior, functioning as the very limitation upon individual free choice
and action which it was designed to eliminate. The perception of such a
dichotomy can lead to a feeling of frustration, a feeling which becomes
heightened if the viewer is made aware not only that the "structuring"
function interferes with the "hygienic" function, but also that the state is
failing to adequately carry out the "hygienic" function-a realization
brought home to people through continually rising crime rates, public
disorders and riots. The continuation of such a sense of frustration can
lead not only to acts of aggression, as shall be seen, but also to a
weakening of the sanction which individuals are willing to grant to the
state, upon which the ultimate power of the state must depend. If people
sanction the state in order to realize protection from acts of victimization,
and not only fail to receive such protection, but also find themselves
subject to restrictions placed upon them by the state, it would be naive to
suppose that the continuation of such a situation would not have adverse
personal and social consequences.
The expectation of the public that the state will protect their lives
and property is quite obviously that which motivates the proponents of
most legislation seeking to restrict and structure some phase of human
behavior to present such legislation in terms consistent with the pub-
lic's expectation. A group of dairy producers, desirous of eliminating
price competition from their industry, would never consider going
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before the public or the legislature and arguing that they cannot match
the efficiency of their lower-priced competitors and, therefore, that the
consuming public should be forced to pay a higher price for milk
through the institution of minimum milk prices. Such an appeal would
constitute a blatant admission that the law was being used simply to
victimize consumers and efficient producers. Instead, the appeal is
presented in terms of "protecting" the consumer and the milk supply
for small children since a higher price for milk will assure the con-
tinued existence of the less efficient dairies. To the degree people
perceive that such legislation is for their benefit and protection, it is
unlikely that any crisis of confidence in the state will be engendered.
Perceived in those terms, people will simply conclude that such action
is in proper fulfillment of the "hygienic" function of the state. Exam-
ples of efforts at "structuring" which have successfully been "sold" to
the public in terms of satisfying the "hygienic" function are many-
they include licensing procedures promoted as a means of protecting
the public from incompetent practitioners of a trade or profession,
when the real purpose is to restrict entry and control the practices of
competitors; antitrust legislation which has been offered as a means of
protecting consumers from monopolistic practices, when the true pur-
pose has been to restrict competition; and tariffs which have been
presented to the public as a device for protecting domestic employ-
ment.
The factors which stimulate the desire of some men to impose a
system of "order" upon other men and institutions by restricting the
opportunities for change and by controlling human conduct for the
benefit of those seeking to impose such order are varied, and would
constitute a worthwhile subject for deeper study. The critical factor,
however, would appear to stem from a basic need which men have to
make the world about them predictable and subject to influence by
their purposeful action. 1 Man, being a reasoning animal, cannot rely
on instinct to guide his behavior, but must perceive reality and con-
sciously devise action which will effectuate a desired result. The more
man's perception of reality conforms to reality, and the more compe-
tent he is at identifying cause and effect relationships, the greater
degree of success he will have in realizing his intended goals. Quite
obviously, then, the more predictable a man's environment is in terms
of his being able to discern recurring patterns of behavior, the better
able he should be to engage in efficacious activity. In order to
maximize his well-being, a man must be able to predict, with reason-
able certainty, the consequences of his actions, and this necessarily
implies his being able to influence his environment. As one observer
has noted:
11. As one writer has added, however, it is not every kind of predictability that men find
desirable and conducive to social order: "To be regularly subject to the violence of others is not to
be secure-quite the opposite." Berger, "Law and Order" and Civil Disobedience, 13 INQUIRY
254, 258 (1970).
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Man is motivated to achieve outcomes which are consistent
with his evaluative beliefs about himself, his evaluative be-
liefs about others, and the degree to which he believes that
there is one set of values (whatever they may be) to guide
behavior in this world. 12
Or, in short: "Regularity is ... a condition of personal security and the
ability to plan our lives in fruitful ways." '13
But perhaps the most significant part of man's environment is
other men; most of man's activities are conducted in relation to other
men. There thus exists the same need to have the actions of such other
men be predictable as there is with respect to the predictability of
man's physical environment. The need men have to be free of negative
influences which restrict their ability to engage in predictable, effica-
cious action in order to maximize their well-being encompasses a need to
have the behavior of others brought within parameters which do not
interfere with the realization of such objectives. Such is the motivation
underlying the "hygienic" function of the law; namely, to make the
social environment as free as possible from victimizing behavior which
would reduce the opportunities for productive and pleasurable activi-
ty. Men do have a need for predictable certainty that their relation-
ships with other men will be free from acts of trespass, theft, assault,
murder and other forms of violence, and that they can go about their
day-to-day functions free from such disorder. The maintenance of
"orderly" social relationships is, then, an adjunct of man's basic
metaphysical need for an environment providing a "consistent out-
come" for his actions.
If the ordering functions of the state were limited to the "hygienic"
function, few objections would probably be raised (assuming the state
was capable of performing that function). As has been seen, however,
the state becomes the object of a power struggle among competing
groups seeking to employ the force of the state against other groups in
order to restrict the scope of the other groups' activity. This "structur-
ing" effort is likewise motivated by a desire to make the socio-
economic environment predictable and more subject to the influences
of those groups which prevail in such a power struggle. The conse-
quence of this method of imposing order is the creation of a conflict with
the basic assumption underlying the existence of the political state;
namely, the elimination of victimization. It is at this point that a "crisis of
confidence" arises which, to the degree men perceive a discrepancy
between the enunciated objectives of the state and the realized results,
will, especially if the action of the state interferes with some important
activity of such men, lead to a feeling of frustration which, consistent
12. Korman, Organizational Achievement, Aggression and Creativity: Some Suggestions
Toward an Integrated Theory, 6 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR & HUMAN PERFORMANCE 593, 595
(1971).
13. Berger, supra note 11, at 258.
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with the "frustration-aggression" hypothesis, may result in some man-
ifestation of aggression, including possibly violence.
II. A THEORY OF FRUSTRATION AND VIOLENCE
A. The "Frustration-Aggression" Hypothesis
The "frustration-aggression" hypothesis received its modern im-
petus from a classic study by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and
Sears,14 and has been reinforced by a significant amount of research by
others. The essence of the hypothesis is that interference with the
goal-directed activity of an individual (i.e., frustration) "can produce
an instigation to aggression,"' 5 or as Neal Miller stated: "Frustration
produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of
which is an instigation to some form of aggression."' 6
Daniels and Gilula elaborated on this hypothesis as follows:
The frustration view states that aggressive behavior occurs
after an interference with ongoing purposeful activity. (This
theory often equates aggression with destructive or damaging
violent behavior.) The primary effect of frustration is to raise
the motivational state of the individual, with the destructive
response itself being a learned behavior. A person feels frus-
trated when a violation of his hopes or expectations occurs,
and he may then try to solve the problem by attacking the
presumed source of frustration.17
Spiegel defined "aggression" in these terms:
Aggression is behavior involving the use of force or its sym-
bolic equivalent to effect an outcome in line with the inten-
tions, or goals, of the aggressor acting against the intentions
or goals of an adversary. It usually, but not always, occurs in
an agonistic situation characterized by a conflict of interests. '8
The relationship of frustration to social disorder has been stated
as follows:
According to the basic frustration-aggression hypothesis, in-
stability results from unrelieved social frustration. One form
of systematic frustration occurs when there are wide gaps
between the needs, expectations or demands of the popula-
tion and their achievement.' 9
14. J. DOLLARD, L. DOOB, N. MILLER, 0. MOWRER & R. SEARS, FRUSTRATION AND
AGGRESSION (1939).
15. L. BERKOWITZ, AGGRESSION 28 (1962).
16. Miller, The Frustration-Aggression Hypothesis, in ROOTS OF AGGRESSION 29, 30 (L.
Berkowitz ed. 1969).
17. Daniels & Gilula, Violence and the Struggle for Existence, in VIOLENCE AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE 405, 410 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula & F. Ochberg eds. 1970).
18. Spiegel, Toward a Theory of Collective Violence, in DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE 19, 21 (J.
Fawcett ed. 1972).
19. Feierabend & Feierabend, Conflict, Crisis and Collision: A Study of International
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It is important to note at this point that in assessing the frustration
experienced by a given individual, one must compare the levels of
"expectation" and "achievement" not by "absolute" or "objective"
criteria, but rather in terms of the disparity felt by the individual
himself. As Crawford and Naditch have stated, we must look to "the
level of achievement or deprivation relative to some standard
employed by the individual as a basis of comparison or self-
evaluation, '20 or as Jerome D. Frank summarized: "The amount of
frustration depends less on the amount of deprivation than on the size
of the gap between what a person has and what he expects or believes
he is entitled to have." '21
That frustration caused by differences between a person's expecta-
tions and achievements can lead to violent social behavior is well-
documented in the literature. Gurr has observed, for example, that
the necessary precondition for violent civil conflict is relative
deprivation, defined as actors' perception of discrepancy be-
tween their value expectations and their environment's appar-
ent value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and
conditions of life to which people believe they are justifiably
entitled. The referents of value capabilities are to be found
largely in the social and physical environment: they are the
conditions that determine people's perceived chances of get-
ting or keeping the values they legitimately expect to attain. 22
Violence resulting from other sources of frustration is also noted in
the literature. For example, as Frank has observed, the failure of the
state to perform its "hygienic" function can lead to violence:
Group conflict arises when each group perceives its goal as
achievable only at another's expense. Domestically, this type
of conflict becomes violent when groups feel intolerably frus-
trated or threatened, and have lost faith in the institutions of
society to satisfy their claims or to protect them. 23
Fred R. Berger is even more explicit in stating that where
certain segments or groups within the population are sys-
tematically exposed to these weaknesses in the ability of the
legal system to provide or protect security, those subjected to
such treatment come to feel "left out" of the social process,
come to regard themselves as the "victims" of the social and
Stability, 1 PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, May 1968, at 28. See also Ilfield, Environmental Theories of
Violence, in VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE 79, 86 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula & F.
Ochberg eds. 1970).
20. Crawford & Naditch, Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The
Psychology of Social Protest, 33 PSYCHIATRY 208, 208 (1970).
21. Frank, Psychological Aspects of International Violence, in DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE 33,
39 (J. Fawcett ed. 1972).
22. Gurr, Psychological Factors in Civil Violence, in ANGER VIOLENCE AND POLITICS:
THEORIES AND RESEARCH 33, 37-38 (I. Feierabend, R. Feierabend & T. Gurr eds. 1972).
23. Frank, supra note 21, at 34.
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political scheme, rather than full participants in it. In such
circumstances, respect for law and the lives and property of
those who do enjoy the benefits of the order the legal system
provides may be considerably weakened. Such conditions
tend to foster counter-violence and retaliatory disorder, either
out of revenge, frustration, a desire to take one's "share" of
the goods of society, or merely the need to assert one's manli-
ness and no longer to "take it lying down." And that the legal
system may very well foster and permit such conditions
which lead to such widespread, relative disorder in a com-
munity can no longer be reasonably denied.24
B. Violence Resulting from "Powerlessness"
But the failure of the state to perform its "hygienic" function is
not the only way in which the actions of the state may lead to violence.
The "structuring" function, by limiting, regulating or prohibiting vari-
ous types of human conduct, creates in the mind of the person so
affected a sense of "powerlessness," an inability to control or influence
his immediate environment in order to make meaningful decisions
relating to his basic life goals. This is perhaps the ultimate sense of
frustration-the inability to achieve a sense of efficacy over one's own
life, due, in large part, to the imposition of barriers and restrictions by
the very institution which one was told would eliminate such negative
influences. The relationship between powerlessness and violence has
been pointed out by Rollo May: "Violence comes from powerlessness;
. . . it is the explosion of impotence. '25 "As we make people powerless,
we promote their violence rather than its control. '26 (May, of course,
speaks of "power" in terms of the ability to make decisions, not in the
sense of the use of force or coercion.)
The full impact of this condition of powerlessness was eloquently
expressed by Grinker:
I believe that we are witnessing at all levels of our social
network a conflict based on dualistic thinking, the polarities
of which are personal or individual freedom as against social
structures maintaining the functions of regulation and con-
trol. Each has moved speedily and quantitatively to become
antagonistic and reactionary to the other. The greater the
demand for freedom, the more repressive measures are set
into action. The more restrictive controls to dampen free-
doms, the more protest and violence as the final common
pathway of many causes. 27
24. Berger, supra note 11, at 262-63. See also L. COSER, CONTINUITIES IN THE STUDY OF
SOCIAL CONFLICT 97 (1967).
25. R. MAY, POWER AND INNOCENCE 53 (1972).
26. Id. at 23. See also Ransford, Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of
Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot, 73 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 581, 583 (1968).
27. Grinker, What is the Cause of Violence, in DYNAMICS OF VIOLENCE 64, 64 (J. Fawcett
ed. 192).
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Rollo May added this thought:
To admit our own individual feelings of powerlessness--that
we cannot influence many people; that we count for little;
that the values to which our parents devoted their lives are to
us insubstantial and worthless; that we feel ourselves to be
"faceless others," as W. H. Auden puts it, insignificant to
other people and, therefore, not worth much to ourselves-
this is, indeed, difficult to admit. I cannot recall a time
during the last few decades when there was so much talk
about the individual's capacities and potentialities and so
little actual confidence on the part of the individual about his
power to make a difference psychologically or politically. The
talk is at least partially a compensatory symptom for our
disquieting awareness of our very loss of power. 28
In short, as Anthony Storr has summarized: "When our drive to
master the environment, or take from it what we need, is obstructed,
we become angry .... ,,29
C. The "Displacement" Theory
A factor which appears to influence how an individual responds to
a given frustrating experience is the degree of sanction he accords the
frustrating agency. Reviewing the studies done in this area, Burnstein
and Worchel concluded that "frustrations which are perceived to be
reasonable or nonarbitrary are accepted with much less overt aggres-
sion than those which are perceived to be arbitrary or unreasonable. '30
Gurr also noted that the learning and socialization processes can
modify the tendencies both as to the perception of and response to
frustrations.3 1 To the degree one sanctions, or at least reveres, the
agency responsible for an interference with an expectation which re-
sults in frustration, there may develop a tendency for that individual
to shift his aggressive response from the causal agency to a substitute
target. This practice, known as "displacement," has been described as
the "shifting of an effect and its behavioral correlates from the original
object to a substitute object, presumably one that is similar to the
original object on certain perceptual or cognitive dimensions. '32
The displacement theory has been used to explain the higher
incidence of lynching during times of economic recession. 33 One can
only wonder how much of the recent violence-some part of it directed
by blacks against their own deteriorated neighborhoods, other parts
28. R. MAY, supra note 25, at 21.
29. A. STORR, HUMAN AGGRESSION 92 (1968). See also Ilfield, Overview of the Causes and
Prevention of Violence, 20 ARCHIVES OF GENERAL PSYCHIATRY 675, 685 (1969).
30. Burnstein & Worchel, Arbitrariness of Frustration and Its Consequences for Aggression
in a Social Situation, in RooTs OF AGGRESSION 75, 75 (L. Berkowitz ed. 1969). See also Gurr,
supra note 22, at 42.
31. Gurr, supra note 22, at 35.
32. H. KAUFMANN, AGGRESSION AND ALTRUISM 32 (1970).
33. See, e.g., H. CANTRIL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENT 78-122 (1941).
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of it directed against banks and businesses with large defense
contracts-may be the product of displaced aggression against an
amorphous, but highly structured, "social order" which is created,
maintained and enforced by the political state for the purpose of
restricting human activity and interfering with the processes of
change, thereby frustrating the expectations of millions of people seek-
ing greater fulfillment in their lives. It may well be that much of the
violence experienced in recent years has grown out of frustrations
developed through the imposition of "order" by a highly regulative
political system, but that, in Kaufmann's words, the frustrated indi-
vidual
realizes that the original object would have been too danger-
ous an object of attack. Therefore, he now selects a new
target which, even though a little less dangerous, is in some
way "similar" to the original tormentor, and thereby still
provides sufficient balm for the aggressor's self-esteem, so
that he can persuade himself that he is not an utter coward,
and that he has behaved in a manly fashion.3 4
III. FRUSTRATION AS A PRODUCT OF
GOVERNMENT REGULATION
A. Examples of Government Regulatin that
Produce Frustration
1. Social Reform Measures.-Many programs have been offered
to the public with the promise they will eliminate various causes of
discontent and promote a greater degree of self-control and direction
for all people. Yet the promised results are often not the real reason for
the program. For example, minimum wage laws are suggested as a
means of increasing the earning capacity of marginal workers, but the
immediate effect of such laws is to increase the number of unemployed
marginal workers because such laws increase the labor costs of
employers. 5 Such legislation has been promoted not out of humanitar-
ian impulses, but out of the desire of labor unions to eliminate
lower-priced sources of labor and the desire of employers who are
already paying higher wages to impose higher costs upon their com-
petitors. Whether or not the supposed beneficiaries of such legislation
recognize the causal relationship between these laws and increased
unemployment, the overall effect is nevertheless detrimental to their
34. H. KAUFMANN, supra note 32, at 32.
35. See, e.g., Benewitz & Weintraub, Employment Effects of a Local Minimum Wage, 17
IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 276 (1964); Douty, Some Effects of the $1.00 Minimum Wage in the
United States, 27 ECONOMICA (NEW SERIES) 137 (1960); Peterson, Employment Effects of State
Minimum Wages for Women: Three Historical Cases Re-Examined, 12 IND. & LAB. REL. REV.
406 (1959); Peterson, Employment Effects of Minimum Wages, 1938-50, 65 J. POL. ECON. 412
(1957).
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interests by depriving them of an expected benefit. Likewise, urban
renewal legislation has been fostered (at least in theory) as a means of
eradicating slums and providing higher quality housing for lower
income people. Yet the history of this program has been that blacks
and other residents of slum areas have been forced out of their existing
homes--thus disrupting their-personal lives and removing them from
familiar surroundings--while their residences were torn down to make
way for new apartments, not for them, but for middle-income tenants.
Whether or not slum residents are aware that such programs have
been undertaken in order to benefit real estate investors and insurance
companies, 36 or whether they even recognize the causal relationship
between urban renewal programs and the failure to solve the problem
of low-income housing, a sense of frustration must be expected from
those who expected results which were not delivered.
Along the same lines, rent control laws have been enacted with an
expressed purpose of providing low-income tenants with reduced
rents. The effect of such laws has been to make it unprofitable for
landlords to make needed improvements on such property, thus lead-
ing to the deterioration of such property, a consequence which can be
expected to increase the frustration of tenants who anticipated im-
proved living conditions. What, too, of the effects of the building
codes, enacted at the behest of contractors and labor unions seeking to
protect their positions, which prevent the reduction of construction
costs by restricting the usage of modern, modular building techniques,
and which thus interfere with efforts to supply lower-cost housing?
One can further imagine the frustration felt by young men and
their families who have been subjected to the military draft, their lives
disrupted and threatened with death or serious injury, especially since
the stated purpose of the military establishment has been to protect its
citizens, not send them off to foreign lands to be killed, and has been
to promote peace rather than to find itself embroiled in the sort of
continuous, pointless wars envisioned by Orwell in 1984, wars which
serve to promote the interests of the state, rather than of its citizens. 37
Then, too, people are told that their being subjected to the restric-
tions of economic planning has been to provide for greater economic
stability, increased productivity and higher standards of living. What
feelings of frustration must follow from the fact that such programs
have not only failed to prevent, but may well have caused, such
phenomena as recession, inflation, higher unemployment, scarcity of
some goods and services and surpluses of others, balance of payments
deficits and devaluation of the dollar, with proposed "cures" consisting
of even tighter economic controls which further restrict and limit the
choices people may make, thus interfering with their opportunity to
36. M. ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BULLDOZER (1964). For the related topic of the effects of
legal intervention into land use, see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972).
37. R. BOURNE, WAR AND THE INTELLECTUALS, 1915-1919 (1964).
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control their own lives and maximize their own well-being. 38 One
writer has suggested that this process not only leads to violence, but is
violence:
The books are full of laws passed, not by the pressure of the
voters, but by the pressure of wealthy businessmen, powerful
labor unions, and influential politicians. This often results in
social injustice, and such injustice is clearly a form of vio-
lence. 39
Freud, himself, recognized this same point in his declaration:
It is a general principle, then, that conflicts of interest be-
tween men are settled by the use of violence. . . . The justice
of the community then becomes an expression of the unequal
degrees of power obtaining within it; the laws are made by
and for the ruling members and find little room for the rights
of those in subjection. 40
Minority group members, for years the victims of discrimination
in employment practices, are told that "fair employment practices"
legislation will open up all sorts of job opportunities. Yet-some ten
years later-the results have not measured up to the promises, and
more and more persons are finding themselves being pigeon-holed into
a highly structured "quota" system for hiring, under which people who
had asked only for the opportunity to be considered for employment on
their merit are once again finding themselves considered for employ-
ment on the basis of their racial, religious, sexual or ethnic profile. Is it
suprising to find such people experiencing a profound sense of frustra-
tion under the circumstances?
In each of the areas just discussed, it is important to point out
that the experienced frustration does not necessarily derive from
people actually perceiving the relationship between the regulated activ-
ity and the failure of the program to achieve the desired result. It is
enough that people have an expectation of a desired result, and that
such result does not materialize. A slum tenant may not be aware that
urban renewal programs or rent control laws have interfered with his
acquiring better housing, but he does know that the promises made to
him have not been fulfilled, and he will likely experience frustration as
a consequence.
2. Police Activities.-A practice which must rank near the top in
terms of the frustration of the expectations of people involves the
failure of the police, in the exercise of the "hygienic" function, to
realize what, as has been seen, is regarded by most people as the basic
purpose of a formal political-legal structure: The protection of the
person and property of individuals from acts of victimization by
38. M. ROTHBARD, AMERICA'S GREAT DEPRESSION (1963).
39. R.N. JOHNSON, AGGRESSION IN MAN AND ANIMALS 225 (1972).
40. Letter from Sigmund Freud to Albert Einstein, September 1932, in THE DYNAMICS OF
AGGRESSION 13 (E. Megargee & J. Hokanson eds. 1970).
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others. This purpose theoretically casts the police in the role of protec-
tors of personal rights and safety, and yet in practice such has not
always been the case. Not only has this system failed to halt rapidly
advancing crime rates-a consequence which, by itself, could be ex-
pected to generate frustration from those who had endorsed and
sanctioned such a system out of an expectation that crime would thus
be minimized-but it also has become the source of additional frustra-
tion to persons, especially minority group members and other low-
income people, who have found themselves the objects of fairly routine
acts of victimization by the police themselves. While there may be a
tendency by some persons to over-react and regard any action by a
police officer as "police brutality," a far more unrealistic reaction is
naively to assume that the metropolitan police forces of this country
are characteristically staffed by officers who view themselves as simply
"public servants," desirous only of promoting the "general welfare" of
the community, while being ever-mindful of the basic rights of all
men. The informed reader needs no recitation of the fairly systematic
abuse of minorities by the police on the streets, or of suspects within
the confines of the precinct station, or of sleeping families whose
homes have been broken into by police officers during the course of an
illegal search. Add to this the documented acts of violence initiated by
the police during the course of demonstrations, the tendency of many
police officers to be "gun-" or "night-stick-happy," the Supreme
Court's recent decision extending the power of search incidental to
traffic arrests, 41 and the like, and one gets the picture of a system
which, far from protecting those who come into contact with it,
provides a threat to their safety. One can only wonder how much
violence has been generated by the police themselves as a result of
their oft-times arbitrary treatment of criminal suspects. To what ex-
tent, in other words, does submission to arbitrariness constitute an
attack upon one's own self-esteem, or pride, and thus encourage vio-
lence as a response? As one individual observed:
The right to resist unlawful arrest memorializes one of the
principal elements in the heritage of the English revolution:
the belief that the will to resist arbitrary authority in a
reasonable way is valuable and ought not to be suppressed by
the criminal law. In the face of obvious injustice, one ought
not to be forced to submit and swallow one's sense of jus-
tice. 4 2
One of the most pressing needs people have today is for protection
from the police and, more importantly, from the structuring of the
police system into a self-serving system which no longer makes a
pretense of existing to serve and protect the interests of the commun-
41. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
42. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128, 1137-38 (1969).
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ity.4 3 It may be argued that a strawman has been set up, and that such
criticism of the police is overly abusive. But nothing here suggests that
all police officers or all police departments are ill-motivated. What is
being suggested, however, is that the police function in America has
become a highly-structured system acting in pursuit of its own objec-
tives, a system which not only has failed to eliminate the negative
influences of victimization, but has become the source of such be-
havior, the net consequence of which has been to frustrate the expecta-
tions of persons subject to it.
3. Economic Controls.-It should not be assumed that racial
minorities or low-income persons are the only ones subject to the
experience of frustration as a result of the actions of government.
While such persons may be the ones most in need of the benefits of
change with which legal restrictions interfere, middle-income people
are also subject to imposed restraints which interfere with economic
processes of change (thus frustrating opportunities), and are further
subject to the burden of an enormous income and property taxation
system, which deprives such persons of a sizable portion of their
earnings, channeling it into uses which they do not perceive as serving
their objectives. That violence is essentially a product of lower-income
areas is a myth which is being eroded by the realization of increased
violence in white, middle-income, suburban America, and by the
recognition that attitudes of frustration, "powerlessness" and despair
transcend all social, economic and geographical lines. That such con-
sequences may be the product of the frustrations flowing from systems
of imposed order which do not serve the expectations of people is a
possibility worthy of deeper examination.
44
B. "Autosystems"
As has been indicated, frustration may result when people per-
ceive that the imposition of "structured" forms of order by a political-
legal system is in conflict with the system's role of preventing acts of
victimization. 44a This perceived sense of frustration is accentuated by a
43. S. PUTNEY, THE CONQUEST OF SOCIETY 30 (1972).
44. Such a question might, for example, explore the role which "displacement" has in
accounting for different forms of aggressive behavior among middle-income and lower-income
persons. It may be that middle-income people, on the whole, tend to revere the political-legal
system more than do lower-income people (i.e., they may identify their interests more clearly with
it) and, thus, displace their aggression onto other objects, while lower-income people may have a
greater tendency to attack the political-legal system more directly (e.g., attacks upon police
officers).
44a. We get confirmation of the proposition that political institutions are not meeting the
expectations of people from studies, such as the one conducted at the University of Michigan's
Center for Political Studies. This study documents a steady decline from 1958-1972 (for whites)
and from 1964-1972 (for blacks) in public trust and confidence in government. A. Miller, T.
Brown, and A. Raine, Social Conflict and Political Estrangement, 1958-1972 (available through
the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan). The question
which needs to be faced is the one presented herein: what are the hidden personal and social costs
associated with the practice of imposing political direction and control over the lives and property
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factor which is associated with the operation of virtually all hierarchi-
cal structures; namely, a tendency to treat the inputs of persons subject
to the organization as secondary to the interests of the organization
itself. Whether an organization is political, religious, economic or
social in nature, it develops an attitude early in its life that the
perpetuation of the organization is to be regarded as the paramount
operational consideration. The organization becomes its own raison
d'etre, and the persons for whose benefit the organization was initially
formed suddenly become a means to the organization's ends. In the words
of sociologist Snell Putney: "[T]he basic problem is that large systems
over a period of time take on objectives of their own, distinct from the
objectives of the men who created the systems in the first place."'45 Putney
defines such a system as an "autosystem," which "is a social system which
comes to pursue its own objectives by its own means and ceases to be
under the effective control of men."'46 These autosystems, in order to
guarantee their own continuation, "persuade their participants that there
is no possible conflict of interest between man and system."'4 7
The process through which this attitude develops involves the
same elements which cause men to want to make their environment
subject to their influence in order to achieve a high degree of predict-
ability favorable to their objectives. There is a sense of security and
certainty in learning a particular pattern of behavior and in having
that pattern remain constant. This is the great attraction of bureau-
cratic procedures: those within the system can simply respond to any
decisionmaking situation with a reference to a known set of rules and
an attempt to fit the situation to the rules. The eventual consequence,
however, of this process is to insulate the system from the feedback of
those persons subject to the system. Korman has reached the following
conclusion regarding the tendency of men to desire "structured" or-
ganizations:
First, the high reliance by authority figures on programming
and rule specification implies that the world is stable and
unchanging enough to permit the utilization and reliance on
general rules and programming. Second, the reliance on
relatively permanent specialization of activities, as opposed
to variation, encourages a belief system that general rules and
routine are the order of things while variations, difference,
and lack of rules as guides are not.
48
It might be appropriate at this point to consider the role played by
one's metaphysical outlook toward other men as a factor in the inci-
dence of "structuring" as a means of providing "order" within society.
of individuals? It is realistic to expect such institutions to continue frustrating personal expecta-
tions without a consequent increase in aggression?
45. S. PUTNEY, supra note 43, at 10.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 11,
48. Korman, supra note 12, at 601.
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To what extent, in other words, is "structuring" a reflection of the
view that men are, by nature, untrustworthy and must therefore be
subjected to force-or the threat of force-as a means of maintaining
any semblance of social harmony? There seems to be a slow deteriora-
tion of this attitude in a number of areas, most notably in education
and industrial management. 49 With a weakening of the doctrine of
"original sin," so to speak, men may someday generally recognize that
there is no basic conflict between individual selfishness and social
order, and that a world of self-directed, self-centered individuals does
not necessarily imply either chaos or the collapse of social institutions.
Healthy organizations--such as those normally found in the market
place--must not only respond to feedback, but, in order to enlarge
upon their support, actively seek out such feedback in an effort to
better plan its operations. (Product market surveys are an example of
this effort.) The greater responsiveness of market organizations to
feedback is not due to any greater sense of maturity on their part, but
is dictated by the competitive nature of the market in which consumers
are neither compelled to pay for the product of any given organization
(as they are with tax-supported government organizations) nor prohib-
ited from transferring their business from one organization to
another. The fact that the business community has been responsible
for fostering the antitrust laws in order to restrict such competitive
conditions 50 is evidence of the desire of virtually all organizations to so
structure their environments in order to interfere with the processes of
change, thereby helping to maintain a status quo situation consistent
with those patterns of behavior which the organization has found to be
most conducive to the realization of its goals.
An organization which is responsive to feedback, then, will de-
velop a flexibility designed to adapt its procedures to meet the new
inputs of those subject to the organization. While the "structural"
system (or, as Putney calls it, the "autosystem") seeks to make the
situation conform to its operational procedures, the healthy organiza-
tion will devise procedures to meet the situation. The forces favoring
structuring, however, tend to gain prominence within any organiza-
tion, and the healthy, responsive system soon becomes a structured
one. As Putney declared:
Systems decay and become stupid through ossification; the
process by which the decision-making centers of a system
come to derive their decisions independently of the informa-
tion inputs and feedback. The decisions become increasingly
49. See, e.g., McGregor, Theory X: The Traditional View of Direction and Control, in
PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVITY 190 (R. Sutermeister ed. 1963); McGregor, Theory Y: The Integra-
tion of Individual and Organizational Goals, in PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVITY 198 (R. Sutermeister
ed. 1963).
50. See, e.g., books cited in note 8 supra.
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unrelated to what is happening within and without the sys-
tem. 51
And Putney further observed: "There seems to be no way of preventing
ossification. It is a natural process in social systems." '
If this process of structuring is inherent in all organizations, even
those subject to competitive influences, it must be wondered what
degree of structuring exists within political systems which do not
depend for their existence upon satisfying people who are free to either
accept or reject such systems. Since they enjoy a position which is
founded upon a monopolistic use of force, and in which financial
support is guaranteed through the taxation process while compliance
with system objectives is assured by the absolute power to command,
political systems not suprisingly become indifferent to the needs and
desires of their subjects, and impose a bureaucratic structure which
serves the system, but not necessarily the people under it. In short, as
Putney noted: "[B]ureaucracies also tend to become autosystems. As
such, they lose sight of the individual and attempt to force all cases
into their standardized categories. '53
Under such conditions, is it surprising to find people experiencing
a sense of frustration because of their inability to communicate their
needs to the political system and to have that system respond to their
expectations? 54 The failure of the public school system to accommo-
date the desires of a parent regarding the education of his child, the
refusal of a local planning commission to permit a property owner to
convert his real estate to a more profitable use, the inability of the
police system to provide the individual with adequate protection of his
person or his property and the inflexibility of political administrators
and bureaucrats in responding to a particular person whose needs do
not happen to fit within the procedural norms of a governmental
agency all serve to demonstrate the frustration of one's objectives
which are experienced at the hands of government. When men are told
that such systems exist to serve and protect them, only to find that
these systems have come to regard their own welfare as paramount,
even when that means sacrificing the interests of the systems' theoreti-
cal beneficiaries, should feelings of frustration be so unexpected?
51. S. PUTNEY, supra note 43, at 37.
52. Id. at 41.
53. Id. at 113.
54. Ilfield states, for example:
Among the multitude of frustrations in America today, several seem to stand above the
rest in current importance: those of the failure of many minority group individuals to
achieve dignity and self-pride, and of poor communities to effectively communicate their
grievances and attain control of their own destinies. Expectations have been increased
but not fulfilled. For many of our people the conditions of poverty, discrimination,
unemployment, and lack of skills, when combined with unfulfilled expectations for
improvement, foster disillusionment and disappointment and tear away at self-esteem
and dignity.
Ilfield, supra note 19, at 89.
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C. Non-Satisfaction of Needs
The degree to which the state fails to respond to the needs of the
people is demonstrated by its tendency to react to expressions of social
discontent in much the same way most employers have attempted to
deal with employee dissatisfaction: disburse more money. The faith
which most organizations have in money as a cure-all for frustration
shows how far out of touch such organizations are with the people they
theoretically serve. More often than not, discontent within an organi-
zation stems from a failure of that organization to satisfy wants totally
unrelated to monetary considerations.
The late Abraham Maslow, in a pioneering work in the area of
human motivation, 5I discerned a hierarchical ordering of human
needs, and concluded that the lowest level of needs will serve to
motivate men until such needs have been satisfied, and that men will
not proceed up the hierarchy to the higher order of needs until the
lower needs have, in fact, been satisfied. He observed, further, that a
need once satisfied no longer serves to motivate behavior (unless, of
course, that need arises again at a later time). Maslow's hierarchy of
needs, from the lowest to the highest level, is as follows:
(1) physiological needs-these are the basic biological needs as-
sociated with the maintenance of bodily functions and would include,
among others, the need for nourishment, oxygen, water and constant
body temperature. It should be fairly evident that an individual who
has not satisfied these needs is unlikely to be concerned with any
higher order of needs until they have been satisfied. Maslow also
pointed out, however, that if all the higher order needs of a particular
person are unsatisfied, he is likely to become dominated by these
physiological needs (such as compulsive eating). Normally, though, the
satisfaction of these basic biological needs will cause a new (and
"higher") level of needs to emerge.
(2) safety needs-one who has resolved the need for his biological
maintenance will find himself concerned with a need to make his
environment as "safe" and "secure" as possible, and to hopefully
eliminate any threats to his well-being. It is this need which undoubt-
edly leads individuals to seek the "predictability" discussed earlier in
this article, and which accounts for efforts to structure the social
environment by the imposition of legal restrictions upon the activities
of other individuals. Maslow noted this need as arising in childhood,
concluding that one "generally prefers a safe, orderly, predictable,
organized world, which he can count on, and in which unexpected,
unmanageable or other dangerous things do not happen .... ",56
As has been seen, this need for a predictably "safe and secure"
environment is not, among most persons, confined to the elimination
55. Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, in PEOPLE AND PRODUCTIVITY 71 (R. Suter-
meister ed. 1963).
56. Id. at 77.
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of threats and violence, trespass or other injury to their person or
property ("hygienic" function), but is extended to the "structuring" of
the behavior of other persons and institutions in order to make their
entire world as predictable as possible, even at the cost of restraining
the freedom of action of others. This latter behavior is not unlike
Maslow's description of the "compulsive-obsessive-neurotic" who will
try frantically to order and stabilize the world so that no
unmanageable, unexpected or unfamiliar dangers will ever
appear. They hedge themselves about with all sorts of cere-
monials, rules and formulas so that every possible con-
tingency may be provided for and so that no new contingen-
cies may appear. They are much like the brain injured cases,
• . .who manage to maintain their equilibrium by avoiding
everything unfamiliar and strange and by ordering their re-
stricted world in such a neat, disciplined, orderly fashion that
everything in the world can be counted upon. 57
It is then, perhaps, the efforts of men to satisfy their needs for
safety, security and predictability that cause some to want to place
restraints upon the activities of others. The problem, of course, which
arises from this is that such restraints interfere with the efforts of other
men to seek the satisfaction of their needs and impose negative
influences which deprive such other men of their need to make their
environment predictable and conducive to their control and influence.
(3) love needs-the general satisfaction of the physiological and
safety needs will result in the development of a need for love, or what
Maslow has referred to as the "love and affection and belongingness
needs." Such needs are fairly self-evident as to their content, and
would include the seeking of affectionate relationships through group
acceptance as well as individual sources of affection.
(4) esteem needs-it is a well-accepted conclusion nowadays that
people have a fundamental need to have a good view of themselves, a
need for "self-esteem." This need, Maslow noted, is next in the hierar-
chical structure, and its satisfaction is dependent not upon false praise,
but "upon real capacity, achievement and respect from others. ' 58
Satisfaction of these self-esteem needs leads to a feeling of efficacy, an
ability to effectively deal with reality both through accurate sensory
perception and the identification of causal relationships which permit
one to take predictable action. As Maslow has stated, such satisfaction
"leads to feelings of self-confidence, worth, strength, capability and
adequacy of being useful and necessary in the world. But thwarting of
these needs produces feelings of inferiority, of weakness and of
helplessness."5 9
It may well be that self-esteem needs contribute, indirectly, to the
57. Id. at 78-79.
58. Id. at 79.
59. Id. at 80.
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need some people have to impose order upon others. If it is correct to
conclude that men have a need to make their world certain and
predictable, that men's self-esteem needs are satisfied and reinforced
by being able to function effectively in that world, and that the
element of "predictability" enhances the opportunities for efficacious
behavior, is it then not likely that men will have a strong motivation
to so structure institutions and social relationships as to facilitate such
predictability? After all, if other men are unrestricted in their de-
cisionmaking and can act and modify their actions freely in response to
the wishes of others, or to conditions in the marketplace; if, in other
words, other men can function as completely self-directed individuals
in pursuit of their own objectives, the ability to accurately predict the
behavior of such other persons is lessened. Greater predictability can
be realized by employing the law-making function to limit the au-
tonomy of other persons.
(5) self-actualization needs-the highest order of needs, according
to Maslow, is the need for "self-actualization," which he defined as
the desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him
to become actualized in what he is potentially. This tendency
might be phrased as the desire to become more and more
what one is, to become everything that one is capable of
becoming. 6
0
This need, then, encompasses man's need for intellectual awareness,
growth and creativity, and can involve virtually any area of human
conduct, including, for example, literary or artistic creativity, business
or professional competency and, in Maslow's terms, "the desire to be
an ideal mother."6 1 That relatively little is known about self-
actualizing people (because there are so few of them) or of the self-
actualization process is readily acknowledged. Suffice it to say, how-
ever, that it involves the process of personal growth, of an individual
seeking to maximize his potential, or, as Maslow stated: "What a man
can be, he must be." '62
While it should be pointed out that Maslow regarded most be-
havior as consisting of an effort to satisfy more than one level of needs
(e.g., sexual activity could satisfy physiological, love, and esteem
needs), the escalation from lower to higher order needs is dependent
upon the basic satisfaction of such lower needs, such that, for exam-
ple, a man facing the threat of starvation is not likely to be motivated
by a need for self-actualization while his hunger needs go unsatisfied.
As Maslow declared:
[T]he most prepotent goal will monopolize consciousness and
will tend of itself to organize the recruitment of the various
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minimized, even forgotten or denied. But when a need is
fairly well satisfied, the next prepotent ("higher") need
emerges, in turn to dominate the conscious life and to serve
as the center of organization of behavior, since gratified needs
are not active motivators. 63
How do Maslow's conclusions relate to the effects on individuals
of interference with goal-directed activity? They would appear to be
completely consistent with the frustration-aggression hypothesis:
Any thwarting or possibility of thwarting of these basic
human goals, or danger to the defenses which protect them,
or to the conditions upon which they rest, is considered to be
a psychological threat. . . . It is such basic threats which
bring about the general emergency reactions. 64
Superimposing the frustration-aggression hypothesis over Mas-
low's hierarchical structure of needs, one would appear warranted to
conclude that men have a highly developed and ever-changing scale of
needs, ranging from those which are purely physical to those which are
purely intellectual, encompassing every conceivable area of human
activity from romance to commercial enterprise, from artistic expres-
sion to the joining of social organizations, from athletic competition to
gardening. These needs differ from one person to another and, within
a given person, from one moment to the next. To the degree that
individuals are free to engage in goal-directed activity in response to
these needs, there is a greater likelihood of need satisfaction, leading to
a greater sense of self-fulfillment and the opportunity to develop higher
order needs. But to the degree such activity is interfered with, such as
by the imposition of formal restrictions limiting the choices and the
actions of the individual, the individual so affected will experience a
frustration of his expectations, with the consequence being an in-
creased likelihood of aggression or violence. While, as has been seen,
men do have a need to make their world predictable, they also have a
need to act in response to a wide range of ever-changing goals, a need
to grow and to develop higher order goals, a need which presupposes a
condition of change and the opportunity to act in response to such
change. Implicit in the concept of "self-actualization" is the need for
flexibility and self-directed activity. It is thus fairly obvious that if a
given individual is interfered with and restrained, whether by acts of
victimization from other individuals or by impositions of controls by
formal systems of "order," he will experience frustration of his efforts
to satisfy his needs.
Reconsidering Maslow's observation that "gratified needs are not
active motivators," an additional point of significance to the subject
matter of this article arises. Just as many employers have learned that
63. Id. at 89.
64. Id. at 90.
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they cannot hope to motivate a man who is seeking to satisfy the third,
fourth, or even fifth level of needs by offering an incentive (such as
money) which is designed to satisfy the first or second level of need, so
too must those seeking a solution to social problems--including
violence-learn to dig through the veneer of stereotyped "solutions" to
find out precisely what needs people do have, and how they are being
hindered from satisfying those needs by a stifling form of imposed
order. The common response of many is to assume that an increase in
welfare payments to low-income people will relieve their sense of
frustration by providing them with an increase in their means for
value satisfaction. 65 This line of reasoning is reminiscent of the re-
sponse of automobile manufacturers to employee demands during con-
tract negotiations: offer them more money. There is a sizable body of
opinion which holds that the strong demands-enforced by periodic
strikes--of the auto workers are not so much a product of wage
dissatisfaction (auto workers are quite highly paid) as they are a
response to the employees' felt sense of frustration at being locked into
a highly structured work environment, characterized by the orderly,
impersonal and predictable assembly line. While these employees, like
anyone else, are always interested in more money, the real needs which
they are seeking to satisfy are those related to attaining a sense of identity,
having greater control and influence over their work environment, and
realizing a greater sense of fulfillment from their work. Unable to realize
these needs, they revert, as Maslow points out, to the expression of the
lower order needs as a substitute.
If highly paid auto workers are seeking to break free of the
frustrations of a highly structured assembly line, can we not also
assume that lower-income people are also desirous of freeing them-
selves from the dehumanizing, over-regulative and over-bureau-
cratized legal structure which they perceive as interfering with their
opportunities for self-fulfillment? If the classic response to such
dissatisfaction-namely, increasing transfer payments to welfare
recipients-does provide the solution, then why do we continue to find
the greatest amount of violence and social dissatisfaction originating in
areas where the inhabitants are the prime recipients of such payments?
Might it not be that men are seeking something more than just an
increased supply of money; is it not possible that they are seeking to free
themselves from restrictions which limit their opportunities to make the
changes necessary to improve their well-being? Is it not within the realm
of possibility that such persons experience a deep sense of frustration not
only at having their expectations thwarted by the system, but also at
having the system so completely misread their needs as to assume that
they can be "bribed" into more submissive conduct with a few dollars? In
the words of one psychiatrist: "In correcting social conditions which
65. Gurr, supra note 22, at 45.
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produce intolerable frustration it should be recognized that 'give-aways'
and paternalism do little to enhance the recipient's dignity and self-
esteem. "66
The conclusion that interference with efforts to realize one's po-
tential (i.e., the "self-actualization" process) leads to violence has been
noted in the literature:
The self-actualization hypothesis suggests that some men ef-
fectively are prevented from using legitimate channels of
self-expression. When this occurs, as it does frequently in the
ghetto, violence may offer an alternative road to achieve-
ment.
67
Melges and Harris made the following observation on the subject:
If a person feels that he no longer has any control over what
will happen to him-if he feels his own actions will have little
effect-he may then feel at the mercy of others .... Since the
person essentially feels unable to direct himself toward his
own goals, he feels unduly influenced by the demands of the
immediate environment, particularly the demands of other
people. This feeling of being influenced may culminate in a
persecutory delusion. But even with lesser degrees of distor-
tion the feeling that one has little control over his own destiny
may lead to attempts to restore oneself as an active agent.
This may involve attacking those who appear to be influenc-
ing and controlling the individual. 68
An essential prerequisite to the process of seeking to maximize
one's potential, or even the effort to make a less significant improve-
ment in one's well-being, is, as has been seen, a condition of change-
change resulting from free-functioning individuals modifying their be-
havior or acting in response to opportunities to gain desired benefits.
The substance of both personal and societal development is change,
and change necessarily implies the absence of restrictions or of efforts
to maintain a status quo. Those who seek to preserve existing relation-
ships by erecting a system of rules and other restrictions do more than
simply protect their position; they interfere with the efforts of other
men to improve their own relationships. The consequence of the
erection of these barriers is not only to frustrate the dreams, hopes and
expectations of those seeking the fulfillment of their own lives, thereby
increasing the likelihood of aggression and violence, but also to break
down the Anglo-American concept of "equal protection of the laws."
Those who are successful in having the kind of order imposed which is
satisfactory to themselves are thus able to realize the sort of world they
66. Ilfield, supra note 29, at 686.
67. Bittker, The Choice of Collective Violence in Intergroup Conflict, in VIOLENCE AND THE
STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE 181, 181 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula & F. Ochberg eds. 1970).
68. Melges & Harris, Anger and Attack, in VIOLENCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE
97, 120 (D. Daniels, M. Gilula & F. Ochberg eds. 1970).
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want, not only for themselves, but for others, while those whose
expectations have been thus interfered with do not realize the kind of
environment they want even for themselves. The "structuring" pro-
cess, then, by its very nature results in a situation in which some men
have, by law, put themselves and their objectives in a position
superior to that of persons whose freedom of choice and action has
thus been denied. Under such a system, to paraphrase Orwell, "all
men are equal, but some men are more equal than others."
IV. CONCLUSION
A factor which seems to have hindered an objective examination
of the relationship between a system of politically imposed order and
the phenomenon of violence has been a broadly-based consensus
among Americans that political structuring and "social engineering"
are necessary to the functioning of a complex society. One may safely
criticize any given political program, or challenge the competency of a
given political leader to effectively carry out desired programs, but faith
in the process of political intervention, direction and planning goes
unchallenged in the minds of most people. The political ordering of
society has become a basic tenet of American life, to the end envisioned by
Herbert Spencer that "no form of co-operation, small or great, can be
carried on without regulation, and an implied submission to the regulat-
ing agencies."' 69 While there is a recognition that certain "excessive"
political practices (e.g., police brutality and corruption of political
leaders) may have dysfunctional effects upon the social structure, there is
an unwillingness to consider that the very institution of imposing order
upon people and, in the process, interfering with their personal objectives
and the direction of their own lives may have the same consequences. As
with any institution cloaked with reverence and awe, there is a reluctance
to consider uncomfortable questions regarding its basic foundations.
Those of intellectually honest persuasion might well choose to examine in
greater depth the degree to which "order," imposed by the state, may
have created a general milieu in which people perceive a frustration of
their personal, economic and social expectations, a frustration which
may lead to acts of violence and other forms of disorder. Such an
examination must consider the nature of the political process, not from
the viewpoint of apolemicist, but of arealist. One must be willing to hold
in abeyance such doctrines as "social contract" and the "general will" long
enough to see if man does, in fact, experience a felt sense of frustration
and victimization as a result of the political ordering of his life even
though, according to some philosophic precept, he is only being "forced to
be free."
It has been the purpose of this article to draw a distinction
69. Spencer, Laissez Faire, in GREAT POLITICAL THINKERS 635, 652 (W. Ebenstein ed., 3d
ed. 1965).
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between the "hygienic" and "structuring" functions of political-legal
systems, and to raise the question of the relationship between the
activities of these systems (both as to the efforts to impose social order
through the "structuring" process and the failure to fulfill the
"hygienic" function) and the increased incidence of violence and other
forms of disorder. The conventional examinations of causes of violence
have tended to focus on such social factors as income disparity, living
conditions and opportunities for employment and upward mobility.
This article has not attempted to deny or affirm any of these possible
explanations, but has offered for consideration-and, hopefully, further
inquiry-the hypothesis that there may be something inherent in any
form of imposed order which leads to a sense of frustration among
persons whose expectations come into conflict with the expectations of
the system and which, when such disparity is perceived by such
persons, and when the alternatives to relieving the disparity fail, may
lead such persons to take up violence in an attempt to eliminate su.ch
disparity. A formal system of legal and political order may, then, be a
dysfunctional institution serving to contribute to the very phenomenon
of violence which it is theoretically designed to control and eliminate.
It would not seem an exaggeration to say that "law" has become
almost synonymous with "political power," and that, transposing
Thrasymachus, law "means nothing but what is to the interest of the
stronger party." With the elaborate growth of "law" into every con-
ceivable sector of human activity, there is little pretense expressed
anymore that law is designed only to serve the "hygienic" function, or
that the parameters of its dictates are governed by anything more than
the basic consideration which influences any power structure: "how
much interference will be sanctioned by the victims thereof?"
This article has hopefully served to focus attention on a possible
explanation for a source of violent behavior which has been all but
ignored. Time has not permitted exploring a tangential question here,
one raised by Robert Ardrey and Konrad Lorenz; 70 namely, the rela-
tionship between the violation of territorial boundaries and the occur-
rence of aggression. The extent to which legal interference, by the state,
with the use, enjoyment and decisionmaking over one's property has
contributed to personal frustration is a question which, alone, justifies
a separate examination. If, after all, people experience frustration from
having their personal activities subjected to restraints which interfere
with their goals, it could hardly be doubted that this same sense of
frustration would extend to interference with the use of their own
property.
Neither has this article inquired into alternatives to systems of
imposed order, but such would merit further exploration. It would
appear justifiable to conclude that men have a need to strengthen and
70. R. ARDREY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966); K. LORENZ, ON AGGRESSION (1966).
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encourage the natural and informal system of order as found in the
operations of such voluntary systems as the marketplace and various
social institutions. Attention should ultimately be focused, perhaps, on
the relationship between the value systems and psychological maturity
of individuals and the degree of order experienced as a consequence of
such factors. Insight into the foundations for true social order might
well be found in the works of such men as Abraham Maslow and in
the realization that the conditions for the process of "self-actualization"
require flexible social institutions which are responsive to the indi-
vidual needs of their members. As a consequence, the conclusion
might be drawn that the basis for any true system of social "order"
comes from within individuals-and is not imposed from without-
and that such order is promoted by an environment in which people
are encouraged to be responsible for their choices and actions. That
such conditions are inconsistent with the maintenance of regulative
and oppressive practices by political-legal systems which seek to re-
strict rather than encourage the processes of growth and change im-
plicit in "self-actualization" is evident upon examination.
The reader may, perhaps, have a tendency to assume a polariza-
tion here between the alternatives of "imposed order" and "disorder,"
and to assume that the choice is between living in a society charac-
terized by chaos, violence and insecurity, or living under a "structured"
system which, while perhaps not perfect, constitutes a more desir-
able alternative. If such were the only available choices, the system of
"imposed order" might well be preferred. But like many questions this,
too, is not susceptible of such limitations of choice, and such a polari-
zation may only be a reflection of the reader's assumptions regarding
the nature of man. For purposes of this discussion, it is not necessary
to again polarize the issues in terms of whether men are, by their
nature, "inherently good" or "inherently bad." It is sufficient to ob-
serve only that men are, by nature, disposed to act in pursuit of goals
which they have set for themselves, that they will voluntarily organize
themselves in order to realize those goals, and that all men disapprove
of their own victimization and thus seek means of preventing it. The
problem, then, is not one of choosing either "imposed order" or "disor-
der," but of recognizing that a system of "imposed order" fosters
"disorder," and of seeking methods of social organization which can,
in fact, promote the degree of social order which most people desire in
order to facilitate the goal-directed activity of each person. In the
words of Rollo May:
In its best sense and by itself, order ought to mean the forms
and conventions by which we live and work together; order
ideally is freedom from disturbing interruptions of peace,
physical safety which in turn gives the psychological security
for the pursuit of intellectual, emotional, and spiritual aims.
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But when coupled with law, it implies a rigid clinging to old
forms of acting, a prevention of the very changes made
necessary by our transitional age." '
71. R. MAY, supra note 25, at 59.
